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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
WESTERN CONTRACTING 
CORPORATION (Employer) 
and EMPLOYERS MUTUAL 
LIABILITY INSURANCE 
COJlPANY OF WISCONSIN, 
(Carrier), 
Plaintiffs, 
-vs.-
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UTAH and LEO A. DAVIS, 
Defenda.nts. 
, 
' ~ Cj r I l u L~·t.:L~ 
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No. 9970 
PLAINTIFFS' REPLY BRIEF 
Appeal From Decision of 
The Industrial Commission of Utah 
CLYDE, MECHAM & PRATT 
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IN THE SUPREME CO,URT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
WI·:~TI•:HX COXTRACTING 
( '( )RPOHATI< >~ (Employer) 
and l•:~IPLOYERS i\IUTU A L 
LIABILITY INSUHANCE 
C0\1 PANY OF WISCONSIN, 
((-.arrier). 
Plaintiffs, 
-vs.-
IXDUsrrRL\ L COi\Ii\IISSION OF 
rTA II and LEO A. DAVIS, 
Defendants. 
Case 
No. 9970 
PLAINTIFFS' REP·L Y BRIEF 
This brief is filed in accordance with Rule 7 5 ( p), 
rtnh Rules of Civil Procedure in order that response may 
be made to what plaintiffs believe are misstatements in 
defenda11t8' brief of (1) the rationale of certain cases 
therein cited, and (2) the underlying philosophy of the 
compensation acts. 
ARGUMENT 
POIXT I. 
THERE IS XO ~IODERN TREND TOWARD 
EYALU.:\.TION OF EYE IJIPAIRMENT ON 
AX rXCORRECTED BASIS. THE SCHISni 
RE~L\IXS. 
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Defendants suggest, on page 8 of their brief, that 
there has been a recent and general judicial acceptance 
of the proposition that visual disability should be eval-
uated without reference to correctibility, so that Profes-
sor Schneider's statement (quoted at page 4 of plaintiffs' 
brief) is no longer valid. 
We will concede, of course, (since we first cited the 
annotations which discuss it) that there is a sharp di-
vision of authority on the issue which here concerns us. 
We do not perceive that the schism is becoming less pro-
nounced, but we submit that, if it is, it is because more 
courts are becoming persuaded that evaluation without 
reference to correctibility does violence to basic com-
pensation principles and common sense. 
What constitutes the "weight" of authority may be 
decided on either a quantitative or qualitative approach. 
The editors of American Jurisprudence still, as of 1963, 
consider it to be the view of "most authorities" that the 
degree of impairment should be determined on a cor-
rected basis. (See statement on page 5 of plaintiff's 
brief.) Some of the very cases cited by defendants as 
most strongly supporting their position are distinguish-
able on their facts from the instant case. In Otoe Food 
Products v. Cruickshatnk, 141 Neb. 298, 3 N.W. 2nd 452, 
for instance, the claimant's injured eye could be im-
proved in acuity by an optical lens, but it could not be 
made to coordinate with his other eye. Defendants cite 
Livingston v. St. Pa;ul Hydraulic Hoist Company, 203 
Minn. 62; 270 N.W. 829, which has since been reviewed 
and its doctrine restated by the Minnesota Court. In 
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r'"t'ko v. Prospect Foundry Company, 115 N.W. 2nd 
477, (May 11, 1962) that Court considered a claim for 
total disability benefits where good vision could be 
restored with glasses. The opinion unequivocally places 
~linnesota among the jurisdictions holding that correcti-
bility should be considered when eye disability is eval-
untetl. At page 483, Justice Nelson, speaking for a unani-
mous Court, says: 
''In determining the extent of injuries to vision re-
sulting from an industrial accident, correction by 
glasses may be taken into consideration.'' 
If a trend can be discerned in recent cases, it is to-
ward the position that disability should be determined 
with due consideration for correctibility. This trend is 
particularly to be noted in cases where an eye is injured 
which was previously industrially blind without glasses 
and because of the injury, can no longer be made effec-
tive by corrective lenses. In Illinois (Lambert v. Indus-
trial Com mission, 411 Til. 593; 104 N. E. 2nd 783) and Vir-\ 
ginia ( Tr alsh Construction Co. v. London, 80 S.E. 2nd 
3~4) the Courts have very recently held that an eye, in-
dustrially blind without correction but functional with 
~lasses, is not really blind and that the workman whose 
Pye is injured so that it is no longer correctible is entitled 
to full compensation. 1/ 
These cases bring dramatically to our attention that 
there is another side to the coin. If we are to conclude 
that correctibility is not to be considered in compensation 
eases, we must also conclude (if we are to be consistent) 
that a workman who is blind without glasses but has good 
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vision with them has lost nothing if he sustains an injury 
which deprives him of the capacity to see with glasses. 
Defendants would ask this Court to find that such a work-
man was already blind within the meaning of the com-
pensation acts. 
There are cases which come to a contrary and, we be-
lieve, ill-reasoned conclusion, but the Courts which have 
demonstrated perception of the entire problem have rec-
ognized a basic and irrefutable difference between cor-
rctible and uncorrectible blindness. 
As has already been pointed out (page 8 of plain-
tiffs' brief) this Court has previously indicated its 
approval of the language of Cline v. Studebaker Corpo-
ration where the Michigan Court said that correctibl(' 
blindness is not blindness at all. The Tenth Circuit Court 
of Appeals, when confronted with a loss of vision case 
arising in Utah, had no hesitation in stating its opinion. 
"We may assume, and it is our opinion," said Judge Cot-
teral, '' ... appellee, having only a partial loss of vision 
which was subject to correction by the use of glasses, 
did not sustain a total disability.'' (United Sta.tes Smelt-
ing Co. v. Evatns, 35 F. 2nd 459.) Whenever a Court in 
this jurisdiction has made a statement relevant to the 
issue in this case, it has indicated its approval of the 
Cline v. Studebaker position. 
POINT II. 
THE PURPOSE OF THE COMPENSATION 
ACTS IS TO PROVIDE A SUBSTITUTE FOR 
EARNING POWER LOST BY REASON OF 
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INDURTRIAL INJURY. IT IS NOT THEIR 
PlTRPOSE TO AWARD DAMAGES FOR 
I~JlTHY. 
Defendants ha\·e urged that this Court adopt an ap-
pron<'h to Workmen's Compensation in harmony with the 
philosophy of that old N.A.C.C.A. spokesman and war-
rior, Samuel Horovitz. Defendants quote from a 1947 
nrtirle of :\I r. Horovitz in which he contends the ''current 
trend" is to treat compensation cases as personal injury 
rnst>s. Such statements have generally horrified those 
whose Yiew of workmen's compensation is more objective. 
Cornell University's Professor Arthur Larson, whose 
11 Law of W'"orkmen's Compensation" (Mathew Bender, 
Hl:>~) is perhaps the most respected work on the subject, 
has this to say in that treatise : 
''Once you decide to make awards for bodily im-
pairments unrelated to earning capacity, where do 
you stop, and on what basis do you calculate the 
amount of the award 1 Let us say, for example, 
that a court decides to make an award for a scar 
on claimant's abdomen which his business asso-
ciates will never see- what is the measure of com-
pensation'? There is only one available guide, 
common-law damages; but surely it would be un-
thinkable to give full common-law damages for 
non-disabling injuries while concededly awarding 
only a fraction of such damages for disabling in-
juries. How much is the South Carolina court, 
having announced that loss of a tooth is compen-
sable even it does not affect appearance, prepared 
to offer for loss of one rear molar which no one 
eYer sees except claimant's dentist? The erratic 
amounts awarded in cases approaching this prob-
lem give some indication of what happens when 
you abandon one principle without putting another 
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in its place. In the South Carolina case, $800 was 
awarded for four teeth; $200 was awarded for the 
same number in the Oklahoma case; while in a 
Missouri case $50 was allowed for the loss of thir-
ty-one teeth.'' 
(Page 50, Volume II, Section 52.32) 
In compensation cases, it is seldom considered ap-
propriate to restate basic principles as a foundation for 
the decision. When Courts do talk about the underlying 
philosophy of compensation, however, they are usually 
direct. For example, the Minnesota Court (for which 
defendants seem to have particular affection) made this 
statement in Miller v. Mutual Life Insurance C'ornpan.y, 
2061\Enn. 221; 289 N.W. 299: 
"In Workmen's Compensation cases, the object 
of the law is to provide benefits to the injured em-
ployee during disability irrespective of the em-
ployer's fault. The law does not contemplate bene-
fits if the employee can be restored to industrial 
capacity.'' 
The Horovitz concept has not been enthusiastically en-
dorsed by the bench or the writers in this field, and it 
should not be adopted by this Court now. 
Respectfully submitted, 
CLYDE, MECHAM & PRATT 
By FRANK J. ALLEN 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
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